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I. INtRoDUCtIoN
In a recent paper, Rodrik (2006) has revived the long-standing but perhaps forgotten argument that rapid growth is associated first and foremost with the expansion of the industrial sector. While this idea was part of the toolkit of the development economists of the "old" school (Rodrik cites �ewis 1954), Rodrik argues that it is somewhat paradoxical that recent thinking on policy reforms pays scant attention to structural transformation and industrial development. Many economists see the development of a modern industrial sector as the key for propelling the structural transformation of an economy. Modern development textbooks (e.g., Ros 2000 , Ghatak 2003 , Thirlwall 2006 emphasize the special role that industry (in particular the manufacturing sector) plays in the development process.
The role attributed to manufacturing in the process of take-off and subsequent catch-up is usually a key element of sectoral studies of growth (Kaldor 1966 and 1967 ; see Felipe et al. 2007 ). It is no surprise, therefore, that economists and policymakers worry about swings in manufacturing. Though economies like Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the Scandinavian countries, and others relied heavily on the primary sector for their development, they all experienced periods of strong industrial growth and diversification as essential components of their sustained economic growth. Rodrik (2006) has argued that sustained growth requires a dynamic industrial base. One can, therefore, speak of the "logic of industrialization" (Nixson 1990 , 313) and understand why many developing countries have adopted strategies toward rapid industrialization, often starting with industries that use relatively simple technologies, and that have the potential to be labor-intensive thus absorbing labor, such as textiles. The experience of the industrial economies appears to show that establishing a broad and robust domestic industrial base holds the key to successful development, and the reason that industrialization matters lies in the potential for strong productivity and income growth of the sector. This potential is associated also with a strong investment drive in the sector, rapidly rising productivity, and a growing share of the sector in total output and employment. The presence of scale economies associated with the secondary sector, gains from specialization and learning, as well as favorable global market conditions, imply that the creation of leading industrial subsectors, along with related technological and social capabilities, remains a key policy challenge.
The objective of this paper is to provide an analysis of developing Asia�s manufacturing sector during the last three decades, benchmarking it with respect to the international regression line by estimating a logistic regression. The rest is structured as follows. In Section II we briefly discuss the transformation of developing Asia�s manufacturing sector during the last three decades. Section III benchmarks the sector by estimating a regression based on the logistic pattern of growth. The final section summarizes the main findings. Figure 2 shows the scatter plot of the output share of manufacturing in output vis-à-vis income per capita, pooling data since 1970 for the whole world. The figure shows that as economies� income per capita increases, so does the share of output in manufacturing, although there seems to be a point beyond which the share starts declining. The figure also shows a wide dispersion in this share for a given income per capita, from very low shares up to 50%. Tables 1 and 2 show decadal averages of the manufacturing share in output and employment. The NIEs have undergone severe deindustrialization as manufacturing has lost significant weight in total output between the 1970s and 2000-2004. In terms of manufacturing employment, all four NIES have clearly deindustrialized, especially �ong Kong, China, where the share decreased by about 25 percentage points in two decades. The declines in the other three economies are significant but smaller. These developments should not be interpreted as "failure" of these economies, but as results of the natural and dynamic process of development, i.e., the transition to service-led economies. Rowthorn and Ramaswamy (1997 and have noted that this group of economies is going through a process similar to that of countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), although it must be noted that it is a process affecting Taipei,China but especially �ong Kong, China, and to a much lesser extent, Korea and Singapore. This is the result of transferring production facilities to the PRC. In Korea and Singapore, the share of manufacturing has remained at about 27% since the1980s.
Section ii Structural tranSformation in Developing aSia'S manufacturing Sector
India�s manufacturing output share has remained stable at about 15-16% since the 1970s, while the share of manufacturing employment has been at around 11% during the periods under consideration. The ASEAN-4 countries (except the Philippines), Cambodia, and �ao PDR have increased their manufacturing shares significantly, both in terms of output and employment. Although Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand are cases of what can be labeled as "successful industrialization", this must be qualified with the following two observations. First, other than Singapore; Korea; Taipei,China; Malaysia; and Kyrgyz Republic, none of the other economies in Table 2 in 2000-2004 had a share of employment in manufacturing as high as that of the OECD average. Second, in terms of labor productivity, there is still a large differential between most developing Asian economies and the OECD average. Indeed, it appears that many economies across developing Asia have industrialized at low levels of productivity ( Figure 3 ). This could be due to two reasons: (i) the product mix of new employment has been toward relatively low-productivity industries; and/or (ii) the increase in employment has taken place in low-productivity techniques. Developing Asia�s increased share in world manufacturing value-added has been accompanied by a significant degree of structural transformation within manufacturing. Table 3 shows the structure of manufacturing output of developing Asia by decadal averages (except latest subperiod). In the 1970s, food and beverages; textiles; and apparel, leather, and footwear accounted for about 39% of total manufacturing, while electrical and nonelectrical machinery and transport equipment accounted for about 17%. By 2000-2003, the former three accounted for a substantially lower 22% while the latter three accounted for about 34%. This shows a very clear change (upgrade) in the structure of manufacturing production. It also shows that the production structure has become slightly more diversified, especially compared to the 1970s. Appendix Table 1 shows this information disaggregated by economy. If we group the different branches of the manufacturing sector according to the level of technology 5 (Table 4) , we can see that developing Asia�s shares in the four categories have increased substantially between the 1970s and 2000/03: from 4.86% to 12.75% in low technology; from 2.51% to 8.42% in medium technology and low economies of scale; from 2.14% to 11.34% in medium technology and medium economies of scale; and from 2.19% to 11.33% in high technology. It is 5 This was done by dividing all manufacturing branches into four groups according to level of technology and scale.
Group 1 corresponds to the manufacturing branches with the lowest technology and scale economies, e.g., food and beverages, tobacco, wearing apparel, leather products. Group 2 consists of plastic and rubber products, paper, among others. Group 3 consists of iron and steel, nonmineral products, among others. is about, as the production of more sophisticated manufactured products leads to faster growth by enlarging the potential for catch-up. In the PRC and India, the shift to more technology-and scale-intensive subsectors is taking place more slowly, while in most other Asian countries the evidence is lacking.
Summing up, the two most significant features of the transformation of developing Asia�s manufacturing sector are, first, its increasing share in world total manufacturing output; and second, its technological upgrade, as reflected in the increasing production of more technologically advanced products.
III. HoW lARgE Is DEvEloPINg AsIA's mANUFACtURINg sECtoR?
A logIstIC REgREssIoN
In order to benchmark developing Asia�s manufacturing sector we have to compare the actual share with that given an economy�s control variables. Which are the latter? The theory underlying the logistic pattern of growth model (Chenery 1960 and 1971 , Kuznets 1966 , Chenery and Taylor 1968 , Chenery and Sirquin 1975 indicates that the most important variable is, not surprisingly, income per capita. This is the result of Engel�s law, namely, the empirical observation that the proportion of consumer expenditure on foodstuffs, the principal product of the agricultural sector, declines as per capita income rises, i.e., the income elasticity of demand for food is less than unity. �ence, there is a decline in the agricultural share, which in turn leads to a decline in the sector�s share of the labor force in the course of economic development. And as the income elasticity of demand for manufactures tends to be relatively high in developing countries and relatively lower in the rich countries, the share of manufacturing in output and employment rises at first and falls later on.
To this purpose, we estimate econometrically the elasticity of the manufacturing share with respect to income per capita by hypothesizing the relationship S i = e a i y a 2 between the manufacturing output share (S i ) and income per capita (y). This relationship can be estimated econometrically by taking logarithms as 1nS i = a 1 + a 2 1n y. The elasticity is given by the estimate of a 2 . �owever, given the possibility of a hump-shaped relationship between both variables, we hypothesize the nonlinear relationship S i = e a 1 y a 2 + a 3 1ny , which can also be estimated by taking logarithms. The income elasticity is then given by η i = a 2 + 2a 3 ln y,, which varies with y. The regression also includes two additional regressors. First we introduce population, a proxy market size. Moreover, the change in the size of population also reflects the change in the actual or potential labor supply. Second, as many Asian economies have followed an export-oriented development path, export performance, which depends largely on the expansion of the overseas market, is an important factor affecting the changing share of the secondary sector in total product. For this reason, we estimate the regression for the manufacturing sector including the trade ratio in GDP (Tr). 6 is the estimated elasticity of the share with respect to income per capita at each income per capita (y* is actual income per capita); and the symbol ^ denotes the estimated coefficient. Regression (1) is estimated with cross-sectional data using ordinary least squares. 7 Point elasticities for 1975, 1985, 1995 , and 2000 are shown in Table 5 . 8 A one percentage point in income per capita leads, on average, to a less-than-one percentage point increase in output and employment shares in industry. This elasticity increased between 1975 and 1985, but then decreased for 1995 and 2000. Moreover, since the relationship between the logarithm of the manufacturing share and the logarithm of income per capita is nonlinear (a hump-shaped relationship), the actual elasticity varies with income per capita. The hump-shaped relationship implies that the elasticity of the manufacturing share is relatively high (positive, i.e., the share increases as income per capita increases) when an economy is poor and then falls as the economy becomes rich (becomes negative, i.e., the share decreases as income per capita increases). The range is shown in brackets. 9 In 1975, the elasticities varied between 0.58 for the poor economies and -0.36 for the rich economies. On the other hand, in 2000, the elasticities varied between 0.36 for the poor economies and -0.11 for the rich economies. The five economies with the lowest and highest elasticities are shown in the bottom half of Table 5 . The regression results also allow us to calculate the turning point, that is, the point at which elasticity turns from positive to negative (i.e., the manufacturing share becomes highest, at which point the income elasticity is zero). This occurs at $9,998 (dollars of 2000). Since the population and trade variables are statistically significant in the regression, we have graphed the predicted line for 2000 in Figure 5 for two different populations, 50 and 100 million, as well as for two different trade ratios, 30% and 100%. Results indicate that population size matters: doubling population from 50 to 100 million increases the manufacturing share by about 2 percentage points 7 Early formal empirical work on the logistic pattern dates back to the work of Chenery (1960) , Kuznets (1966 and 1971) , Chenery and Taylor (1968) , Chenery and Syrquin (1975) , among others. Chenery argued that it was justifiable to interpret cross-sectional results as normal growth functions (Chenery 1960, 635) . Kuznets, on the other hand, argued that cross-sectional results could not be used to infer time-series patterns (Kuznets 1966, 436 ). The issue is crucial as it boils down to the correct interpretation of the patterns of development: cross-sections are snapshots at one point in time that help situate a country�s performance vis-à-vis that of other countries. �owever, "development patterns" refer to the structural changes that have occurred within a relative long span. Moreover, patterns will be relevant (in the sense of helping devise policies that can foster growth) if they appear in countries� experience over time and if understanding them guides policy formation. Jameson (1982) took up the issue and tested the growth patterns hypothesis with data for 89 developing countries, finding that the time series estimates violated the expected results: 45% of the sample countries deviated from the expected pattern (either the slope of the primary or of the secondary sectors had incorrect sign). �e concluded that "time-series for countries in the postwar […] cannot be used as evidence favoring the existence of patterns of development [.…] Kuznets� suggestion was correct and claims of patterns of behavior must be confined to cross-section data" (Jameson 1982, 432 ). 8 The point elasticity is calculated as η MA a a y = + ( ln *) 2 3 2 using the average income per capita ( y * ) of all economies. 9 The range shows the smallest and highest elasticities calculated as η MA a a y = + ( ln *) for low income per capita, and by about 3 percentage points at high income per capita. Moreover, openness also matters: increasing the trade ratio from 30% to 100% increases the manufacturing share by 6 percentage points for low income per capita, and by about 8 percentage points for high income per capita. The results also indicate that the maximum income per capita corresponds to a manufacturing share of between 19% and 27% (depending on the population and trade share combinations).
Actual and predicted shares (i.e., where the latter is each economy�s expected share given its income per capita, population, and trade ratio) for developing Asia are shown in Table 6 . Economies can be divided into three groups, depending on whether (i) the actual share is higher than the predicted one; (ii) the actual share is lower than the predicted; or (iii) the predicted and actual shares are about the same and the economy is on or very close to the regression line.
In the first group of economies we find PRC; the NIEs except �ong Kong, China; the ASEAN-4 except the Philippines; Cambodia; �ao People�s Democratic Republic; Armenia; Kyrgyz Republic; Tajikistan; Fiji; and Samoa. The PRC and the NIEs�s very high manufacturing shares are the result of explicit industrialization policies as the basis for their development (see Wang and �i 1995 on the PRC). Although declining with respect to the average of the 1980s, the share of the manufacturing subsector in total output in the PRC has been traditionally much higher than anywhere else. It still accounts for about 34.5% of total output, only matched in developing Asia by Malaysia, Thailand, and Tajikistan. The share of manufacturing employment, on the other hand, has declined from about 15% in the 1980s to 11% at present. where S i = manufacturing output share; y = GDP per capita; P = Population; and Tr = Trade ratio. "***" and "**" mean significant at 1% and 5%, respectively. In the second group we find India; �ong Kong, China; Azerbaijan; Mongolia; Turkmenistan; Uzbekistan; Kiribati; and Papua New Guinea. The case of �ong Kong, China was already discussed above: this economy has undergone deindustrialization as a result of the transfer of manufacturing plants to the PRC. Today it is one of the most service-oriented economies in the world. The other interesting case in this group is India. Why is India�s manufacturing share in GDP about 4 percentage points lower than what it should be (i.e., India�s manufacturing base is relatively small by international standards, after controlling for income per capita, population size, and openness to trade)? Economists have not been able to agree on the causes, or resolve the issue empirically. A review of the literature indicates that a combination of factors, which includes the reservation policy (as of January 2007, the manufacture of 237 items was reserved for small and medium-size companies); the "license-permit Raj" (which lasted until 1991 and was responsible for India�s large administrative machinery); and the somewhat restrictive labor laws (although this is very controversial and unsettled), combined with lack of adequate physical, social, and regulatory infrastructure, are responsible for the relative underperformance of the sector. 10 Finally, the rest of the economies (i.e., Philippines, �iet Nam, Other South Asia, Kazakhstan, and Tonga) are in the third group. In the case of the Philippines, although the share is well predicted (and therefore it is not low when benchmarked), it is important to note that this country had the highest manufacturing output share among the ASEAN-4 in the 1970s, but by 2000-04 the share had decreased by about three percentage points and was the lowest in the group. Its industrialization policies have been a failure with the result that its actual manufacturing share is much lower than that of Indonesia and, especially, Malaysia and Thailand. So what are the reasons for the lack of industrialization? This is a tricky question given that in the 1950s a sophisticated manufacturing sector emerged, bolstered by protection and a well-developed human capital base. As in the case of India, several reasons account for the poor performance of the sector: an uncompetitive cost structure, fast liberalization and poor infrastructure, and distributive conflicts and dysfunctional institutions that have prevented the development of the appropriate institutional prerequisites for sustained growth. 11
Iv. CoNClUsIoNs
This paper has, first, described the changes in developing Asia�s manufacturing sector during the last three decades. Second, it has used a logistic regression in order to benchmark economies� share of manufacturing output in GDP with respect to the international regression line. The most salient conclusions are as follows:
The share of developing Asia in world manufacturing output has increased significantly since the 1970s. �owever, the increase is concentrated in a number of economies, mostly the NIEs, PRC, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand.
(ii) The NIEs have started experiencing a deindustrialization process, very clear in the case of �ong Kong, China (in terms of both output and employment shares). This is the result of maturation of this economy and the transfer of production facilities to the PRC. (iv) Nevertheless, the productivity levels of most economies across developing Asia are still very far from those of the OECD. The exception is the NIEs.
(v) The PRC; NIEs (except �ong Kong, China); ASEAN-4 (except the Philippines); Cambodia; �ao PDR; Armenia; Kyrgyz Republic; Tajikistan; Fiji; and Samoa have actual manufacturing shares significantly higher than those predicted by a logistic regression that controls for income per capita, trade share, and population.
(vi) India is the most significant case of a country with an actual manufacturing share lower (by four percentage points) than what corresponds given its income per capita, trade share, and population. The actual manufacturing share of �ong Kong, China is very low due to the transfer of manufacturing activities to the PRC. The Philippines�s predicted share is very close to its actual share, but it is significantly lower than that of the other ASEAN-4 economies.
(viii) In the logistic regression, the trade share and population variables are statistically significant. Doubling population from 50 to 100 million increases the manufacturing share by about 2 percentage points for low income per capita and by about 3 percentage points at high income per capita. And increasing the trade ratio from 30% to 100% increases the manufacturing share by 6 percentage points for low income per capita and by about 8 percentage points for high income per capita. The results also indicate that the maximum income per capita, about $10,000 (in 2000), corresponds to a manufacturing share between 19% and 27% (depending on the population and trade share combinations). 
